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ABSTRACT
Urban drainage systems (UDSs) are complex large-scale systems that carry stormwater and
wastewater throughout urban areas. During heavy rain scenarios, UDSs are not able to handle
the amount of extra water that enters the network and flooding occurs. Usually, this might
happen because the network is not being used efficiently, i.e., some structures remain underused
while many others are overused. This thesis proposes a control methology based on mean
field game theory and model predictive control that aims to efficiently use the existing network
elements in order to minimize overflows and properly manage the water resource. The proposed
controller is tested on a UDS located in the city of Barcelona, Spain, and is compared with
a centralized MPC achieving similar results in terms of flooding minimization and wastewater
treatement plant usage, but only using local information on non-centralized controllers and using
less computation times.
Keywords: Urban Drainage Systems, Mean Field Games, Model Predictive Control, Hy-
brid Linear Delayed.
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RESUMEN
Los sistemas de drenaje urbano son sistemas complejos y de gran escala que transportan tanto
aguas negras como aguas de lluvia a trave´s de las zonas urbanas. Durante eventos de precip-
itacio´n muy fuertes, estos sistemas no son capaces de manejar la cantidad de agua adicional
que entra y ocurren inundaciones indeseadas. Normalmente, esto pasa porque la red no esta´
siendo utilizada eficientemente, i.e., algunas estructuras permanecen sub-utilizadas y otras se
encuentran sobre-utilizadas. Esta tesis propone un esquema de control basado en la teorı´a de
mean field games y de control predictivo que busca utilizar eficientemente la red para mini-
mizar las inundaciones en cualquier escenario, y garantizar una utilizacio´n adecuada del recurso
hı´drico. El esquema propuesto es probado en la red de drenaje de la Riera Blanca en la ciudad
de Barcelona y es comparado con una estrategia de control basada puramente en control pre-
dictivo, obteniendo resultados similares en terminos de inundacio´n y utilizacio´n de plantas de
tratamiento, pero utlizando u´nicamente una fraccio´n del costo computacional.
Palabras clave: Sistema de Drenaje Urbano, Juegos de Campo Medio, Control Predictivo,
Modelo Lineal Hı´brido con Retardos.
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RESUM
Sistemes de drenatge urba` (UDS) so´n sistemes complexos a gran escala que transporten aigu¨es
pluvials i residuals en les zones urbanes. Durant escenaris de fortes pluges, UDSs no so´n
capac¸os de manejar la quantitat d’aigua addicional que entra a la xarxa i es produeix la in-
undacio´. En general, aixo` pot succeir perque` la xarxa no esta` sent utilitzat de manera eficient,
e´s a dir, algunes estructures segueixen sent infrautilitzades mentre que molts altres so´n usats
en exce´s. En aquest treball es proposa una metodologia de control basat en la teoria de mean
field games i control predictiu que prete´n utilitzar de forma eficient els elements de xarxa exis-
tents per tal de minimitzar els desbordaments i gestionar adequadament els recursos hı´drics. El
controlador proposat es prova en un UDS situada a la ciutat de Barcelona, Espanya, i es com-
para amb un MPC centralitzat aconsegint resultats similars en termes de minimitzacio´ de les
inundacions i la utilitzacio´ de la planta de tractament d’aigu¨es residuals, pero` nome´s utilitzant
informacio´ local en els controladors no centralitzats i l’u´s de menys temps de ca`lcul.
Paraules clau: Sistemes de Drenatge Urba`, Jocs de Camp Mitja`, Control Predictiu, Model
Hı´brid Lineal amb Retards.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Urban drainage systems (UDS) are complex networks of interconnected pipes and nodes that
carry stormwater and wasterwater to wastewater treatment plants, which treats it and sends it
to the enviroment [BD04]. In many cases, the design of these networks ends up being under-
dimensioned, because of rapid urbanization in cities and climate change scenarios, not being
taken into account in early stages of the design process [WANON12]. For that reason, heavy
flooding may appear in urban areas, and some serious sanitary problems may occur due to the
unproper management of wastewater that comes out of the network into street level [BD04].
Some of the adressed solutions to that problem seek to do a restructuration to the hydraulic de-
sign of the network by adding storage elements throughout the system, so that the overflows are
totally avoided [NADZ13]. Even though these solutions are quite effective, they are extremely
expensive in both time and money.
The problem above could be solved, without having many large modifications being per-
formed to the general design of the network, by using real-time control (RTC) techniques
[GBGE+15]. These techniques seek to find a way to properly manage the active elements of
the network, e.g., retention and redirection gates, in order to achieve an efficient management of
the wastewater, and thus, assuring a minimization of overflows that may appear. Optimization-
based control techniques have been the most widely used techniques in the literature to solve the
problem of minimization of overflows in UDS. For instance, model predictive control (MPC)
has been widely used to solve the problem [CQS+04, OM10], due to its flexibility in the selec-
tion of performance functions, constraints, and its multiple-inputs multiple-outputs capabilities
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[Mac02]. However, many of the proposed techniques are based upon centralized schemes for the
determination of control actions to be perfomed, which could derive into heavy computational
burden problems [MMDLPC11] and cyber-security-related problems [CAS08].
In order to deal with some of the computational burden problems, aggregated models of
the UDSs, e.g., the so-called virtual-tank (VT) model, are used to reduced the number of states
of the system and, in term, the size of the optimization problems. These approaches are quite
effective for many system, but deliver poor results when the network is heavly interconnected,
i.e., when there is a large amount of connections among the pipes and nodes [JD14]. For that
matter, there has been an increased interest in techniques that do not use aggregated models
of the system, such as the one proposed in [JD14], where each element of the system is taken
into consideration, without sacrificing computational time due to its linearity. Nonetheless, it is
possible to encounter quite complex networks that require partitioning and decentralization, in
order to guarantee suitable computation times for real-time applications.
For that reason, there has been an increased interest in studying distributed control tech-
niques [CSMndlPnL13]. For instance, [BGORB+15] propose a distributed control methodol-
ogy based on population dynamics, that achieves an efficient use of the network and guarantees
a minimization of flooding. However, on that methodology, local controllers are not able to con-
sider proper cost functions, which can be problematic if there are multiple control goals such
as, moving wastewater between a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) and out of the network,
while efficiently using the network and minimizing flooding. Moreover, the technique requires
an aggregated model, which could derive into poor results, as stated before.
This thesis proposes a technique that aims to solve problems related to distributed infor-
mation on local controllers, as well as problems related to the aggregation of large portions of
the netwoks into single variables, by using a game-theoretic approach (i.e., dynamic games)
combined with a hybrid linear delayed (HLD)-based MPC. Differential game (DG) theory
[BO95] gives a natural extension of optimal control to scenarios with multiple controllers that
are optimizing its own performance criteria [MSA14], and thus its framework is well suited for
optimization-based non-centralized control applications. This type of games have been used in
the literature to solve problems related to the formation control of mobile robots [Gu08], prob-
lems related to demand response in power grids [FEMRH15], and the control of surge tanks
[FKV12]. This is due to the fact that DGs have the ability to consider multiple cost functions
as well as non-centralized information on distributed controllers. As for the UDS control prob-
lem, it has been reported that these networks can be seen as partitioned systems that are being
controlled by multiple local agents that interact with each other [BGORB+15]. Hence, it is
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a suitable idea to apply the DGs framework to the control of UDS, where multiple local con-
trollers act as players of a game where they interact with each other, in order to guarantee a
proper operation of the network in terms of wastewater management.
It is quite important to point out that, even though DGs are quite useful for many non-
centralized control application, they generally fail to succeed when the number of sub-systems,
i.e., the number of agents, is large, because in order to compute the solution to a DG, it is
required to solve a set coupuled partial differential equations (one per each agent in the game).
Nonetheless, a novel tool called the mean field games (MFGs) [LL07, HCM03] allows to solve
large scale DGs in which the number of agents tend to infinity. Hence, it still is suitable idea to
use DG to solve non-centralized control problems.
The main contribution of this thesis is the design of a non-centralized control methodology
based on large-scale DGs, i.e., a MFG, in the same spirit as in [NCMH13, BMA14], which seeks
to determine the optimal behavior of each active element of the UDS by using a consensus-like
algorithm, only using local information of the network. The proposed methodology has the
advantages of optimization-based techniques used for the control of UDS, e.g., MPC, as well
as the ability to have distributed information in the controllers. Moreover, since only local
information is used, less data is needed, and thus less computational resources are involved
in the computation of the control inputs. The proposed methodology is flexible enough that
it allows to combine game-theoretic approaches with more traditional approaches, such as the
MPC.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
• Study the mean field games and its applications to engineering problems.
• Study the relationship that exist between mean field games and predictive control.
• Design a control stretegy that combines mean field games and predictive control.
• Apply the proposed strategy to a real combined sewer system.
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a introductory back-
ground on dynamic game theory. It shows all the necesary tools to understand the ideas behind
this thesis. Chapter III presents some preliminary results that show the main limitations behind
differential games. Chapter IV presents the relationship that exists between the dynamic games
and the UDSs. Therein, the concepts behind the agents and the enviroment are presented, as well
as the different cost functions that the agents might minimize. Chapter IV also states the main
problem to be solve in this thesis, as well as the required tools for a real-time implementation
of the solution. Chapter V presentes the case study in which the approach is tested. It shows
a portion of the UDS found in the city of Barcelona, Spain, called the Riera Blanca network.
Chapter V also presents the main results obtained using the proposed approach, as well as a
comparison between the proposed scheme and a more traditional tool for solving the problem.
Finally, Chapter VI collects all the conclusions obtained after finishing the thesis.
Related Publications
Chapter III is entirely based on
A. RAMIREZ-JAIME, N. QUIJANO, C. OCAMPO-MARTINEZ. A Differential Game Approach
to Urban Drainage System Control. American Control Conference, 2016. (Accepted)
Part I
State of the Art and Problem
Statement
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter aims to present the main concepts behind dynamic games. Since this thesis is
concerned with this type of games, it is a suitable idea to introduce the reader to this notions.
Only the main topics are presented, for a more detailed presentation, the reader should refer to
a full text book regarding the area, e.g., [BO95].
2.1 Differential Games
Mean field games (MFGs) are a kind of differential games (DGs) in which a large number of
agents are involved. Hence, it is convenient to first describe the main concepts behind DGs
theory, in order to fully understand how the MFGs work.
Consider a traditional optimal control problem (OCP) of a dynamical system whose evolu-
tion is given by the following ordinary differential equation (ODE)
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t), t), x(0) = x0, (2.1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state of the system, u ∈ Rm is the input (or control signal) of the system,
and t ∈ [0, T ] is the time. The objective of the OCP is to determine a control signal u that
optimizes the following performance criteria
J =
∫ T
0
g(x(t), u(t), t)dt+G(x(T ), T ), (2.2)
where g(·, ·, ·) is known as the running cost, and G(·, ·) is known as the terminal cost. The
7
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Game
Theory
Differential Games
Optimal
Control
Figure 2.1: A DG can be defined as the relationship that exist between
game theory and optimal control.
problem of optimizing (2.2) subject to (2.1) can be used to solve several known problems, e.g.,
moving a vehicle using the least amount of fuel, tracking a set-point in the least amount of time,
among others.
DGs extend the idea behind OCPs to scenarios in which there are several independent con-
trol inputs altering the evolution of the system, which in turn are trying to optimize their own
performance criteria. Therefore, a DG can be defined as the optimal control of a dynamical
system that has N ≥ 2 independent inputs; hence, each agent in the game manipulates a control
input ui of the system, which ultimately determines its evolution. Nonetheless, each agent is
optimizing a performance criteria similar to (2.2), which may depend on the actions of other, as
well as on the current state of the system (that is being alter by every agent), and this simluta-
neous optimization is known as a game. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between game theory
and optimal control, i.e., the DGs.
2.1.1 Main Framework
Following the ideas from [Bre11], the main framework of the DGs is presented. Without loss
of generality, the model is presented for the two-players case, but it can be augmented to any
number of agents.
2.1 : Differential Games 9
Consider a dynamical system in x ∈ Rn, evolving in time according to
x˙(t) = f(t, x, u1, u2), t ∈ [0, T ], x(0) = x0, (2.3)
where u1(·), u2(·) are the control signals or strategies implemented by the agents (also known
as players). These strategies must satifiy
u1(t) ∈ U1, u2(t) ∈ U2, (2.4)
for some given sets U1, U2 ⊆ Rn.
Each agent in the game is optimizing a performance criteria given by
Ji(u1, u2) = ψi(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
Li(t, x(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt, i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.5)
where Li are the running costs and ψi are the terminal costs. The functional (2.5) is a map that
returns a scalar value for any pair of strategies u1 and u2 chosen by the agents, and thus, they
must choose their actions so that their payoffs are optimized, taking into account the decisions
of others.
In order to describe the general framework of a DG, it is necessary to describe the type
of stretegy that a given agent is using. These stretegies depend on the information that each
agent has available regarding the current state of the game. If a player does not have available
the current state of the game, and only knows its initial condition, the strategies are open-loop
strategies. Similarly, if an agent has available the current state of the game, the strategies are
closed-loop or feedback strategies.
Finally, the following assumptions must be made in order to fully describe the game:
• Every agent in the game has knowledge of the evolution of the game, i.e., the function f .
• Every agent in the game has knowledge of the current time of the game, i.e., t ∈ [0, T ].
• Every agent in the game has available the initial state of the game, i.e., x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn.
In optimal control theory, the solution to an OCP refers to finding a control signal that op-
timizes a given performance criteria. However, notion of a solution in a DG might not be as
apparent, since any solution of a game is associated to an equilibrium of the game. Tradition-
ally in game theory, there can be several types of equilibria in a game, e.g., Nash, Pareto, or
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Stackelberg. Nonetheless, for this thesis, only the Nash equilibrium is considered and thus the
solution the of game is refered as the set of control signals that determine the Nash equilibrium.
According to [Nas50], the Nash equilibrium of a N -player game, where ui is the strategy that
the i-th player is using, is defined as:
“An equilibrium point is an N -tuple {u1, u2, ..., uN} such that each player’s strat-
egy optimizes his payoff if the strategies of others are held fixed. Thus each player’s
strategy is optimal againts those of the others.”
Nash’s definition can be written as follows (and assuming that each player is minimizing his
cost functional):
Ji(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(u∗1, u∗2, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ), (2.6)
where Ji is the performance criteria that the i-th player is minimizing, {u1, u2, . . . , uN} are any
set of admisible strategies, and {u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗N} are the strategies that determined that Nash
equilibrium of the game. Hence, any set of strategies that simultaneously satisfy the above
inequalities, are a solution to the game, i.e., are Nash optimal. It is very important to point out
that a Nash equilibrium may not be unique.
2.1.2 Open-loop Strategies
As it has been stated before, there are several types of strategies that the players in a DG can
use. If the players have available the initial state of the game but do not have access to the
current state, the strategies used by the players are called open-loop strategies. This implies that
in order to solve the game, the agents must find two strategies u∗1 and u∗2 that simultaneously
minimize their performance criteria, only using the initial condition x(0) = x0.
Recalling the traditional OCP described by (2.1) and (2.2), it is possible to determine the
optimal control signal u∗(t) only using the initial state of the system, by solving the so-called
canonical equations of optimal control [Kir12]. This canonical equations state that in order to
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solve the OCP it is require to solve the following system
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u∗(t), t),
p˙(t) = −p(t)∂f
∂x
(x(t), u∗(t), t) +
∂g
∂x
(x(t), u∗(t), t),
u∗(t) = arg min
u∈U
{
g(x(t), u∗(t), t) + p · f(x(t), u(t), t)
}
,
x(0) = x0,
p(T ) = ∇G(x(T )),
(2.7)
where p ∈ Rn is the co-state of the system, u∗ ∈ Rm is the optimal control input, and
x(0), p(T ) ∈ Rn are the initial and terminal conditions for the state and co-state, respectively.
This set of equations come from formulation the Euler-Lagrange equation for the cost functional
(2.2) and setting the state equation (2.1) as the constraint.
In order to determine the open-loop solution to the DG, it is possible to use the same tools
as for the OCP. However, since the goal is not to determine a single function but two control
signals, the problem becomes more complex. For the DG scenario, in order to determine the
set of strategies that characterized the solution of the game described by (2.3) and (2.5), it is
required to solve the following set of canonical equations:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), t),
p˙1(t) = −p1(t)∂f
∂x
(x(t), u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), t)−
∂L1
∂x
(x(t), u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), t),
u∗1(t) = arg min
u1∈U1
{
L1(x(t), u
∗
1(t), u
∗
2(t), t) + p1 · f(x(t), u∗1(t), u∗2(t), t)
}
,
p˙2(t) = −p2(t)∂f
∂x
(x(t), u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), t)−
∂L2
∂x
(x(t), u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), t),
u∗2(t) = arg min
u2∈U2
{
L2(x(t), u
∗
1(t), u
∗
2(t), t) + p2 · f(x(t), u∗1(t), u∗2(t), t)
}
,
x(0) = x0,
p1(T ) = ∇ψ1(x(T )),
p2(T ) = ∇ψ2(x(T )),
(2.8)
where a new co-state equation and control input appear to accomodate for the second cost func-
tional.
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2.1.3 Closed-loop Strategies
In many cases, the players of a DG have available the current state of the game, and use that
information for their advantage. When the agents are allowed to use the information of the
current state of the game, and react according to that information, their strategies are refered as
closed-loop or feedback strategies. Hence, for the two-player DG defined by (2.3) and (2.5), the
goal is to find a pair of control inputs u∗1 and u∗2 that simultaneously minimize both performance
criteria, by using the current state of the game.
As for the open-loop case, it is convenient to first analize the equivalent OCP, in order to
achieve a better understanding of the solution. Traditionally, if one wanted to solve a problem
of this nature using the current state as given information, the solution would imply having a
control law. It is well known that this control law can be obtained by means of a tool called
dynamic programming [Bre11]. Conceptually, dynamic programming is used to solve discrete
time problems; nonetheless, it can be used to solve continuous time problems, such as an OCP.
By extending Bellman’s principle of optimality [BD62] to continuous time, it is possible to
determine that the optimal cost associated to (2.1) and (2.2) can be determined by solving the
following partial differential equation:
∂J∗
∂t
(x(t), u(t), t) + min
u
{
g(x(t), u(t), t) +∇xJT f(x(t), u(t), t)
}
= 0,
J∗(x(T ), u(T ), T ) = G(x(T ), t),
(2.9)
known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, where J∗ ∈ R is the optimal cost.
From the second term in the HJB equation, it can be to notice that there is a relationship between
the optimal cost and the optimal control law, hence, by determining the optimal cost, the optimal
control law can be obtained.
As it has been shown before, in a DG problem there is not a single cost functional to be opti-
mized; there are two or more objectives that must be optimized simultaneously by the players in
the game, thinking about the actions of others. This implies that in a DG there are several partial
differential equations, one for each player, the determine the optimal cost for each functional.
Since all cost functionals depend on the state of the game, which in turn depends on the actions
of the agents, this partial differential equations are coupled. Thus, in order to solve the game
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described by (2.3) and (2.5), it is necessary to solve the following set of equations:
∂J∗1
∂t
(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t) + min
u1
{
L1(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t) +
∇xJT1 f(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t)
}
= 0,
∂J∗2
∂t
(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t) + min
u2
{
L2(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t) +
∇xJT2 f(x(t), u1(t), u2(t), t)
}
= 0,
J∗1 (x(T ), u1(T ), T ) = ψ1(x(T ), T ),
J∗2 (x(T ), u2(T ), T ) = ψ2(x(T ), T ),
(2.10)
where the equations are coupled by the state of the game, as well as the Li functions referenced
in (2.5).
2.2 Mean Field Games
MFGs are a branch of game theory that models dynamic decision making in scenarios where the
number of players is large. The main idea behind MFG is to avoid modeling all the interactions
among the players on the game, and only model the interaction between the agents and the mass
of others. This mass is related with the distribution of the state of the players in the space, and
can be modeled using statistichal mechanics tools [LL07, HCM03].
As it has been stated before, in order to solve an N player DG in which the agents are using
feeback strategies, it is required to solve a set coupled HJB PDEs. Although this is possible
when N is not large, it becomes challenging as N grows, i.e., when the number of players in
the game grows. For that matter, a novel tool is required to solve this kind of games, so that the
optimal strategies for large numbers of agents can be determined. In order to study this large-
scale games, it is proposed to analyze the behavior of a single agent and the bulk properties of
others. In that sense, a single agent is not concerned about his single interaction with every other
player, but rather to the aggregated effect of many individuals. Thus, large populations can be
simplified into a single variable that collects all the information to describe the mass of agents.
In order to study a set of players as a single mass, it is convenient to study their statistical
properties. This simply means that in a MFG, agents are not concerned about the state xi of
every other player, but rather to how these states are distributed in the state space. However,
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between DG and mean field theory.
this only makes sense if the number of agents in the game is large enough so that the action of
a single individual does not affect the overall evolution of the system, i.e., a single agent is not
able to lead the game by itself. This behavior has been studied by physicists in the framework of
statistical mechanics, and thus, it is a suitable idea to borrow the mathematical tools from their
framework in order to model MFGs. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship that exists between DGs
and statistical mechanics (by using mean field theory).
Consider a set of N agents playing a DG in which N is sufficiently large so that the actions
of a single agent do not affect the overall state of the game. Also, consider that all agents
belong to the same population, i.e., all agents can be considered as subsystems with similar
state equations. By saying that the agents have similar state equation, it is understood that if one
look at the state equation of a representative agent of the population, i.e., a fictional agent that
shares the similar characteristics with others in the population, his state equation would be as
follows:
dx = f(x(t),u(t), t) dt+ σ dB(t), (2.11)
where f(·, ·, ·) is a function that generalizes the dynamics of all agents, and σ dB is a stochastic
component that indicates that agents are not exactly alike. Notice that σ dB can be considered
as a parameter that models the differences in the evolution of the states of the players. It is
important to point out that if all agents have the same state equation, (2.11) would be exactly
the function that determines the evolution of any agent.
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It has been stated that in a MFG agents are only concerned about the distribution of the
states of others. Given that the states of the players are evolving in time, the distribution of their
states also evolves. Hence, this distribution of the states can be written as a variablem(x, t) that
determines how the entries of the state vector of the game are distributed at each time instant.
Given that the representative agent of the population gives the best characterization of the agents
of the system, it is possible to say that its state variable is a random variable that is distributed
as m. In statistical mechanics, it is well-known that the evolution of the probability distribution
of a random process given by an controlled state equation is given by a PDE known as the
Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation. Hence, the evolution of the m(x, t) is given by
∂m
∂t
(x, t) +∇ · (m(x, t) f(x,u, t)) = σ
2
2
∆m(x, t), (2.12)
where ∆ =
∑n
i=1
∂2
∂x2i
is the Laplacian operator. Notice that in Equation (2.12) possesses the
function f that determines the evolution of the representative agent of the population. Equation
(2.12) gives the information about how the state vector is distributed at all time instants, and
thus, agents can use this information to make their optimal decisions. It is also important to
point out that 2.12 does not give information about the current state of each player of the game,
as this information is not required for the computation of optimal strategies (as will be seen
next).
The considered representative agent of the population behaves as every other agent in the
game. Hence, he is trying to optimize a given performance criteria, but now the information
about the mass of others is known, i.e., the function m(x, t). The representative agent of the
population is minimizing the following performance:
J(x,u,m, t) = E
[∫ T
0
g(x,u,m, t) dt+G(x,m, T )
]
, (2.13)
where g and G only depend on the current state of the representative agent and the distribution
of others. Notice that since the representative agent is only a mere generalization of every agent,
solving the OCP for this agent derives in the best control law for every agent.
The minimization of the cost functional (2.13) subject to the state equation (2.11) can be
written as a HJB as in the case of the DGs. The HJB equation associated with the representative
agent is as follows:
∂J
∂t
+H(x,u,∇xJ,m, t) + σ
2
2
∆J = 0. (2.14)
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Figure 2.3: MFG system of PDEs.
Since this HJB equation uses the information from the distribution of the system, it is coupuled
with the FPK presented previously. This means that in order to determine the best strategy
for the representative agent, and in term for every agent, it is required to solve a set of two
PDEs. This set of PDEs is know as the HJB-FPK system of PDEs, and is a canonical set for the
MFGs. The relationship that exists between the distribution of the players and their actions is
summarized in Figure 2.3.
The canonical system for the MFGs is sumarized next:
∂J
∂t
+H(x,u,∇xJ,m, t) + σ
2
2
∆J = 0,
∂m
∂t
(x, t) +∇ · (m(x, t) f(x,u∗, t)) = σ
2
2
∆m(x, t),
J(x,m, T ) = G(x,m, T ),
m(x, 0) = m0.
(2.15)
The system (2.15) characterizes the equilibrium of the game; if one is able to find a control
law u∗ and a distribution m∗ that simultaneously solve the system, the Nash equilibrium can
be found. This fact mean that, in order to find the best strategies for a large scale DG in which
the dynamics of the agents are similar, it is only required to solve two PDEs. Notice that this
problem can be seen as a traditional OCP with an extra constraint: the FPK equation.
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2.3 Summary
This chapter has presented the basics of game theory required to understant the content of this
thesis. The DGs and the MFGs have been briefly enunciated, as well as how they can be solved.
The notion behind the Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game has been stated. The main difference
between closed-loop strategies and open-loop strategies has been also stated. Likewise, the main
theoretical differences between MFGs and DGs have been enunciated.
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH
This chapter is entirely based on:
A. RAMIREZ-JAIME, N. QUIJANO, C. OCAMPO-MARTINEZ. A Differential Game Approach
to Urban Drainage System Control. American Control Conference, 2016. (Accepted)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes an introductory scheme in which only a DG is considered. This allows
to understand the main concepts behind dynamic games and CSN in a real case study, but also,
allows to point out the main dissadvantages of a full DG approach. This leads to the necessity
of use of techniques such as the MFG.
3.2 Problem Statement
3.2.1 Urban drainage system model
Water running through the pipes of a UDS can be modeled by using the so-called Saint-Venant
equations (SVEs), which use mass and momentum conservation principles, in order to describe
the phenomena occurring inside the pipes [Cho59]. These equations describe in a quite high
level of detail how water flows. However, that level of detail is usually not required for control
design. For that reason, a control-oriented model based on the virtual-reservoirs model is used.
In this approach, the UDS is divided into a set of interconnected real and virtual tanks (VT).
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According to [OM10], a VT is a storage element that represents the total volume of wastewater
inside the pipes associated to a determined portion of the network. The volume is calculated via
a mass balance equation, so that the state equation of the i-th tank is given by
v˙i(t) = q
in
i (t)− qouti (t), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}, (3.1)
where vi is the total volume of water of the reservoir, qini and q
out
i are the total inflow and
outflow coming in and out of the i-th reservoir, and N + 1 is the total number of reservoirs.
For this thesis, it is assumed that the reservoirs are linear, and therefore the outflow of every
tank is proportional to the volume stored in it, i.e., qouti (t) = kivi(t), where ki is a volume/flow
conversion (VFC) constant.
Finally, it is assumed that there is a retention gate located at the output of every VT. This
implies that the manipulated inputs of the system are the outflows of VTs, which can be adjusted
by opening or closing the gates. Since the outflow is proportional to the volume of the reservoir,
the following constraint must hold:
0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ kivi(t), ∀t ∈ R+, (3.2)
where ui is the manipulated outflow of the i-th reservoir.
The tree-shape topology of the UDS can be simplified by using the VT model by saying
that any portion of a given UDS can be seen as a collection of tanks, whose outflows converge
into a common reservoir, until the outlet reservoir is reached. For instance, Figure 3.1 shows
a typical tree topology with 21 VTs of a UDS after the simplification is used. Notice how the
whole network eventually converges to the drain reservoir vdrain, and every VT (least the drain
VT) has a retention gate located at the output that regulates the outflow. Hence, (3.1) can be
written as
v˙i(t) = −ui(t) +
∑
j∈Si
uj(t) + di(t), (3.3)
where Si is the set of tanks whose outflows go directly to the i-th tank, di is the total inflow
from rainfall entering the i-th reservoir, and knowing that constraint (3.2) must be satisfied at all
times. It is important to notice that di acts as a disturbance that alters the state of the i-th tank.
Since the last tank of the network does not have a retention gate at the output, its state equation
is written as
v˙N+1(t) = −kN+1vN+1(t) +
∑
j∈SN+1
uj(t) + dN+1(t), (3.4)
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Figure 3.1: Typical tree topology of a UDS after the simplification based on
VTs is applied.
where SN+1 is the set of tanks whose outflows go directly into the drain tank. Equation (3.4)
states that the drain tank cannot control its outflow.
3.2.2 Information graph
A directed graph can be used to represent the interactions among the tanks of a UDS
[JDJOM+14]. This representation gives useful insights on how water moves throughout the
pipes, but it is also useful in distributed control design because it can describe communication
structures among local controllers. On an usual representation, a vertex of the graph corre-
sponds to a reservoir of the network, and edges represent the flow of water among the reser-
voirs of the network. The edges of an usual UDS graph representation, e.g., [JDJOM+14],
are oriented in the direction of gravity, i.e., from an upstream tank to a downstream one. For
this thesis however, the directed graph G = (V, E), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN , vdrain} and
E = {(vi, vj) ∈ V × V | vj ∈ Si}, represents the UDS. Notice that the only difference with the
standard representation is the orientation of the edges. Define Ni = {vj ∈ V | (vj , vi) ∈ E}
as the neighborhood of the i-th reservoir, i.e., all the reservoirs to where the outflow of the i-th
tank is going to. This neighborhood describes the information that is available to each agent
located at each vertex of the graph, i.e., the local controller responsible for the manipulation of
the outflow of single reservoir. The reason for the selection of this graph architecture is that, in
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order to determine its best action, every local controller should know all the states that its local
actions are altering, i.e., all the tanks of its neighborhood.
3.3 Differential Game Controller
The proposed scheme uses a distributed consensus algorithm based on a DG, in the same spirit
as in [Gu08], which seeks agreement on the normalized volume of the tanks. This allows for the
retention of the proper amount of water upstream, and guarantees an even use of the reservoirs.
According to [BO95], the so-called dynamic game theory studies multi-player decision mak-
ing in situations where not only the actions that players (also known as agents) make are impor-
tant, but also the order in which they are made. This means that the game is going to evolve over
time following the actions that have been made by the agents. Analogously, DG theory stud-
ies multiplayer dynamic decision making in situations where the evolution of the game can be
described by a set of first-order differential equations. Then, it can be said that DG theory stud-
ies the optimal control of dynamical systems that have several independent manipulated inputs.
This framework allows for the design of distributed optimal control strategies for dynamical
systems with several inputs (both manipulated and non-manipulated) [BB08].
For the proposed DG, an agent is a local controller that is responsible for the control of
one retention gate. This agent can be seen as the dynamical system composed of the i-th tank
and the i-th retention gate. This agent has available the volume stored in the reservoirs of its
neighborhood, e.g., agent i-th has available the volumes of the tanks in Ni. The goal of this
agent is to change the outflow of a reservoir in order to achieve an even normalized volume on
the tanks of its neighborhood. Since the decisions that a single agent makes have an inpact on
the game, and thus on other agents, the standard optimal control tools cannot be applied directly,
and DG theory must be used instead.
According to [BO95], to properly define a DG, it is necessary to define a state equation that
describes the evolution of the game, and a set of cost functionals to be optimized by the players.
State equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be written in matrix form as
v˙(t) = Av(t) +
N∑
i=1
Biui, (3.5)
where v = [v1, v2, . . . , vN , vdrain]> ∈ RN+1 , and A and Bi are matrices of proper dimensions.
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Define v as the state of the game. On this formulation, each agent computes one ui and seeks
the minimization of
Ji =
T∫
0
{ ∑
j∈Ni
wij(v¯i(t)− v¯j(t))2 + riu2i (t)
}
dt, (3.6)
wherewij ≥ 0 and ri > 0 are weightening factors, and T is the duration of the game. Therefore,
(3.6) can be written in compact form as
Ji =
T∫
0
{
v¯>(t)Qiv¯(t) + riu2i (t)
}
dt, (3.7)
where Qi ≥ 0. Cost function (3.7) states that the i-th agent tries to seek an agreement on the
normalized states of its neighborhood, while using a minimum amount of energy in the process.
In this thesis, the following assumption is to be made in order to have a proper definition of a
DG.
The simultaneous minimization of the functionals (3.7) subject to the state equation (3.5)
describes a linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game (DG) [BO95].
3.3.1 Nash equilibrium
The solution to the previous DG requires the simultaneous minimization of cost functionals that
are, in general, not the same. Hence, the notion of optimality is not as clear as in a standard
optimal control theory, because there is no single criteria for what an optimum is. In traditional
game theory, the notion of optimality is augmented into the notion of equilibrium, and thus
allowing the search of a solution to the previous problem [BO95]. There are several different
types of equilibria that can be found in a DG. For instance, if one of the agents announces its
strategy before hand and every other agent reacts to that doing, the optimal behaviour of the
agents is known as a Stackelberg equilibrium [BO95]. For this work however, only the so-called
Nash equilibrium (NE) is studied. An NE is a set of strategies where no agent can improve its
payoff by changing its strategy while others keep theirs fixed [Nas50]. According to [Eng05], a
set of actions (u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗N ) is an NE for an N -player game, where each player is trying to
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minimize Ji, if for all (u1, u2, . . . , uN ) the following inequalities hold:
Ji(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N )
≤ Ji(u∗1, u∗2, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
(3.8)
Then, it can be said that an NE of the game is a set of strategies where u∗i is the best response
for the i-th agent, regardless of what any other agent is doing. Since the proposed controller
derives into an LQ DG, it makes sense to study the NE within that framework.
The study of DGs requires the knowledge of the information pattern associated to each
player. The information pattern is the information that a player is allowed to have throughout
the duration of the game. Two information patterns are usually analyzed on DG theory: open-
loop information patterns, and feedback information patterns [BO95]. The difference between
these patterns is whether or not an agent is allowed to have the current state of the game. It is
important to point out that, although on the open-loop information pattern agents are not able to
measure the state vector of the game, they do know what the initial condition is. In this thesis,
only open-loop information patterns and their associated NE are studied, due to the simplicity
of its analysis.
The following theorems have been adapted from [Eng05, Th. 7.1], [Eng05, Th. 7.2], and
[Eng05, Col 7.3.], for this particular application, and defining Si = Bir−1i B
>
i .
Theorem 3.1. The N -player DG described by (3.5) and (3.7) has an unique open-loop NE for
every intial state v(0) if and only if det(H(T )) 6= 0, where
H(T ) = [IN+1 0N+1 . . . 0N+1]e−MT

IN+1
0N+1
...
0N+1
 ,
and
M =

A S1 S2 . . . SN
−Q1 −A> 0N+1 . . . 0N+1
−Q2 0N+1 −A> . . . 0N+1
...
. . .
−QN 0N+1 . . . 0N+1 −A>

.
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Theorem 3.2. If H(T ) is invertible, then the set of coupled Riccati equations
P˙i = −A>Pi −PiA−Qi +
N∑
j=1
PiSjPj , P(T ) = 0N+1,
has a unique solution in [0, T ] and the set of strategies
u∗i (t) = −r−1i B>i Pi(t)Φ(t, 0)v(0),
characterizes the NE of the game, where
Φ˙(t, 0) = (A−
N∑
i=1
SiPi)Φ(t, 0), Φ(t, t) = IN+1,
is the state transition matrix of the closed-loop system.
Theorems 1 and 2 determine the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the simultaneous
minimization of the cost functionals (3.7) subject to the state equation (3.5) in terms of a NE, for
every initial state of the system. This means that, the solution of the game for the UDS problem
depends heavily on parameters that can be selected, e.g., T and ri. Thus, they can be chosen so
that the solution always exists for every v(0). This is particularly useful because the proposed
methodology uses an open-loop information pattern to compute the optimal strategies, and a
receding horizon approach is needed to give feedback to the solutions [Gu08]. Moreover, since
Theorem 3.2 presents a way to compute the open-loop strategies, they can be calculated easily
for recursive approaches, such as the receding horizon approach.
As noted by [Gu08], it might seem that, in order to compute the optimal strategies u∗i , every
agent requires the whole state vector v(0). However, since matrix Qi only has non-zero entries
at the positions of Ni and i itself, and given that the matrix A has a diagonal structure, the
solutions Pi of the coupled Riccati equations only have non-zero elements at the positions of
the i-th agent and its neighborhood. Therefore, u∗i is in fact a distributed control law.
3.3.2 Receding horizon DG
In general, open-loop control strategies are not able to react against those disturbances that may
alter the state of the system. Hence, the open-loop strategies developed previously are not able
to work sussesfully for the addressed problem, since the control of UDS depends heavly on the
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disturbances (rainfall) that alter the system. However, a receding horizon scheme [Gu08] can be
used to take care of that problem and add feedback to the overall law.
The set of strategies u∗i are determined at t = 0 for the time interval [0, T ], which means that
the system only knows how it should behave during that period. However, that set of strategies
can be recomputed at t = t1 for time interval [t1, T + t1], so that the system knows how it
should behave at a different time interval. To recompute the strategy, the system has to measure
the initial state (which is now v(t1)) at a new time, hence a feedback appears. This process
is repeated for {t2, t3, . . .} until any desired final time is reached. This scheme is known as
a receding horizon scheme and allows to have feedback on DG with open-loop information
patters.
The algorithm used in this thesis is shown in Algorithm 3.1, where tf denotes the final time
of the simulation scenario.
Algorithm 3.1 Algorithm used for the receding horizon DG.
While t 6= tf :
{Measure current state vector v(ti)
Solve the DG ∀t ∈ [ti, T + ti]
Compute the optimal stretegies u∗i for v(ti)
Apply u∗i during [ti, ti+1]
ti = ti+1 }
Algorithm 3.1 is based upon discrete time increments, while the analysis for the computation
of the optimal strategies is done on continuous time. This implies that during two discrete
time instants, the system is applying a continuous time function that evolves over time, and
thus, the system is using an open-loop law between two consecutive discrete times. This is
different from traditional receding horizon approaches [Mac02], because the control input is able
to change in between a given time interval. However, during the computational implementation
of the controller, it is required to have a time discretization on the system, and thus, on the
optimal strategies. If the selected sampling time for the implementation of the controller is short
enough, it can be assumed that the strategies do not change during a time interval. Hence, for
the implementation of the system, constant functions are applied during [ti, ti+1].
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3.4 Case Study
The proposed controller is tested with the network shown in Figure 3.2a. This UDS is composed
of 4 sub-catchments that drain into a tree-like network that, in turn, converges into a common
outlet node. This network gives a convenient representation of how a full-size UDS would look
like, because of its strong convergence topology. Moreover, this network allows to study one of
the most common problem associated with UDSs, which is the uneven use of the pipes of the
system, which leads into poor wastewater management, and in most cases, flooding. Hence, this
network is a suitable testbed for determining the performance of controllers of UDSs.
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(a) Tree-shape network. (b) Simplified network.
Figure 3.2: Case study. a) Proposed network for the testing of the control
strategy; and b) Equivalent model of the UDS after the VT
simplification is used.
The system is simplified into a set of 6 interconnected VTs using the virtual-reservoir model,
where a single tank corresponds to all the pipes in between retention gates, or a retention gate
and a inlet or outlet node. The simplified network is shown in Figure 3.2b, where the sub-
catchments drain directly into Tanks 1, 2, 4 and 5. Since an information graph is necessary to
describe the information available to each agent, and following the definition of Section 3.2.2,
Figure 3.3 shows the associated graph of the proposed case study.
This model requires the calibration of two parameters: the VFC and vmax for each reservoir.
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vdrain
v1 v2
v3v4 v5
Figure 3.3: Information graph that determines the information available to
each agent in the case study.
Table 3.1 presents the parameters asociated with the simplified network. They have been ob-
tained using simulated data gathered from MatSWMM [RBRJBG+15], which is a co-simulation
tool for UDS with Matlab and EPA-SWMM. Due to the fact that the sub-catchments have differ-
Table 3.1: Parameters of the simplified model
Reservoir VFC ×10−3 [s−1] vmaxi ×104 [m3]
v1 0.4 1.9543
v2 0.8 0.2933
v3 3.3 0.3578
v4 0.5 0.2762
v5 0.8 0.2976
vdrain 1.8 0.3032
ent geographical locations, they recieve different amounts of rainfall, and thus the total inflow
entering each reservoir is different. Figure 3.4 shows the rain scenario proposed for this appli-
cation where, di represents the total inflow entering the i-th reservoir.
The key idea is to test how the network reacts with the proposed rain scenario, which in fact
generates overflow downstream of the UDS. Then, it is going to be determined whether or not
the proposed methology is able to manage the tanks eficiently so that the flooding is minimized
and the water resourse evently distributed.
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Figure 3.4: Proposed precipitation event for the case study. di corresponds
to the total inflow entering the i-th reservoir of the system.
3.5 Results and Discussion
In order to determine the actual performance of the proposed scheme, the system is tested for
three different cases: i) the UDS with no controller on the loop; ii) the UDS being controlled
via a centralized model predictive control (MPC); and iii) the UDS being controlled via a dis-
tributed control strategy based on a DG. The performance of the controllers is analyzed upon
how effenciently the reservoirs are being used, and what the total flooding is.
The centralized MPC used for comparison has the following cost function:
JMPC =
Hp−1∑
k=0
w13(v¯1(k)− v¯3(k))2 + w23(v¯2(k)− v¯3(k))2
+w3d(v¯3(k)− v¯d(k))2 + w4d(v¯4(k)− v¯d(k))2
+w5d(v¯5(k)− v¯d(k))2 + r1u1(k)2 + r2u2(k)2
+r3u3(k)
2 + r4u4(k)
2 + r5u5(k)
2,
which can be written in compact form as
JMPC =
Hp−1∑
k=0
||v¯(k)||2L + ||u(k)||2R, (3.9)
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Figure 3.5: Open-loop response of the system during the proposed
precipitation event. It shows the evolution of the normalized
volumes for a 10-hour window.
where u = [u1, u2, . . . , uN ]>, L is the Laplacian matrix of the graph with edge weights wij ,
R > 0 is a diagonal matrix with all ri on the diagonal, Hp is the prediction horizon, and
k ∈ Z+ denotes the discrete time. It is important to point out that Hp has been selected so
that the prediction window matches the duration a the DG, i.e., T . The reason for the selection
of this cost function is to have a consensus-like algorithm in the centralized MPC, so that both
controllers, i.e., MPC and DG-based, have the same overall goal.
As for case i), Figure 3.5 shows the open-loop response of the system, i.e., when there are
no controllers manipulating the retention gates, for a 10 hours window. It is shown that there
is not a proper management of the reservoirs, since they are not evently used. For instance,
some reservoirs, such as 1 and 3, remain underused, while the drain tank presents an overuse of
about 50% of its maximum capacity. This is due to the fact that upstream reservoirs only recieve
water from rainfall, whereas the downstream one recieves wastewater from many different tanks
which, in term, recieve from rainfall. Therefore, upstream tanks can retain water in order to
release some of the burden existing downstream, which leads to a better usage of the existing
network.
Cases ii) and iii) evaluate the performance of the system when two different controllers are
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(a) MPC controller on the loop. (b) DG-based controller on the loop.
Figure 3.6: Closed loop response of the system when 2 controllers are
applied. a) Centralized MPC controller; and b) Distributed DG
controller. The normalized volumes of the tanks for a 10 hours
window is shown.
used. Both controllers have the same objective: to seek and agreement on the normalized vol-
ume of the tanks. The main difference between both schemes is that the MPC uses centralized
information in order to calculate the optimal outflows, whereas the DG only uses local infor-
mation to achieve its goal. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the normalized volumes for a 10
hours window, when the two controllers, i.e., MPC and DG-based, are applied. Both controllers
are able to completely remove the overflow found in the open-loop scenario. As for the MPC
(Figure 3.6a), the normalized volumes become almost identical after a short time. This is a sign
of proper management of the reservoir, which proves that the control strategy fulfills its goal.
The controller based on the DG (Figure 3.6b) also completely removes the flooding from the
network, and is able to manage the VTs so that their normalized volumes move close together.
The proposed scheme achieves a similar performance compared to a centralized controller in
terms of flooding minimization and wastewater management. Nonetheless, the MPC requieres
a lot of extra computational resources, which is a major problem in a large-scale system. For
instance, the simulation of the system for a 10 hours time window takes 1 time unit to complete
for the DG-based controller within the loop, whereas it takes 27 time units to complete with
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the MPC controller on the loop. These data have been obtained by using normalized values
with respect to the fastest time, from the times collected using Matlab routines. The reason
for this normalization is to have a simpler comparison between the measured times. Hence, a
methodology such as the one proposed in this work thrives in large-scale problems where having
optimization-based controllers is convenient.
3.6 Conclusions and into MFGs
Although the previous approach is quite useful for some applications, i.e., when an aggregated
system is used, it can be challenging when the number of agents grow. This is due to the extra
Riccati equations that must be solved, that cause the explicit solution of the DG to become
untractable. For that matter, it is important to utilize tools that allow to solve DG that involve
large numbers of agents, i.e., the MFGs.
CHAPTER 4
CONTROLLER DESIGN BASED ON
DYNAMIC GAMES FOR CSN
This chapter collects the ideas that link the dynamic games shown in Chapter 2, with the real-
time control of a combined sewer system (CSN). It shows some key concepts such as the defini-
tion of agent and the idea of his rationality. Moreover, it shows how this type of game is directly
applied as a control strategy for CSN.
4.1 The Dynamic Game Definition
Typically, UDS have a strong convergence topology where many pipes end up into a common
outlet node, until the drain node is reached. This causes most of the burden to be suffered down-
stream and quite little burden to be taken upstream of the network. This means that, usually,
upstream pipes remain underused, so they could retain some water (by using retention gates) in
order to minimize overflows downstream. The proposed scheme aims to solve that problem, by
using a decentralized controller based on dynamic games, so that most of the pipes on the UDS
are used efficiently, and the total overflow is minimized. Moreover, the proposed scheme seeks
an integration with state-of-the-art techniques, e.g., MPC, to deliver more suitable results when
other objectives are required, e.g., the minimization of combined sewer overflow (CSO).
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4.1.1 Elements of the Dynamic Game
According to [BO95], in order to properly describe a dynamic game theory problem, it is re-
quired to state what an agent is and what his actuation mechanisms are for the selected appli-
cation, in order to properly described how the strategy can be applied. Moreover, it is required
to state how the different agents in the game are reasoning, i.e., what function they are trying to
optimize, as well as how the overall game is evolving, i.e., the system dynamics. It is important
to point out that these definitions are not unique and depend heavily on the proposed scheme.
The first required definition is the concept of an agent. Agents are local controllers that
are able to manipulate the physical actuation mechanisms of the UDS. For instance, an agent
might be a local controller capable of changing the inflow to a particular sewer pipe or storage
unit. This means that in general, the agents are responsible for the selection of the appropiate
control signals in order to guarantee a suitable operation of the system. This leads to the second
required definition: the reasoning of the agents. As it has been state before, the reasoning of
the agents are measuring functions that depend on the actions of the agents, and determine their
performance in the game. For this thesis, the main goal of the agents is to distribute evenly the
rainwater that enters into the network during a heavy rain event, so that no part of the system
is prone to overflow due to the overuse of the capacity of the pipes and storage units. This
reasoning can be captured by the minimization of the following cost function:
Ji =
∫ T
0
(xi(t)− φ(x(t)))2 + rui(t)2dt, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (4.1)
where xi is the state of the system that the i-th agent is able to manipulate, φ(x) is a Lipschitz
function of all the states of the system, ui is the action that the i-th agent is taking, N is the
total number of agents, T is a time horizon, and r is a weight parameter. It is important to point
out that a single agent might be able to change multiple states of the system; if that is the case,
the cost function would have a quadratic form of the states, instead of a simple substraction.
The cost function (4.1) expresses the desire of each agent to change the states that his capable
to manipulate, so that they become as close as possible to some function of the states system.
Notice that having the function φ(x) is quite flexible in the sense that it allows to express the
desire of a particular agent to modify the volume of a cluster of sewer pipes that are under his
control, so that it becomes as equal as possible to the volume of some other cluster of pipes.
Finally, the third required definition is the dynamics of the game, which ultimately deter-
mine how the agents interact with each other and with the system. This definition is quite
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simple, given that the game dynamics derive from mass balance equations. This causes the state
equations of the different sewer pipes to be linear with respect to the inflows and outflows to
themself. The general evolution of the game is given by (this equation is going to be explined
in more detail in the forthcoming sections):
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +
N∑
i=1
Biui(t), (4.2)
where A and B are matrices of proper dimensions. Notice that (4.2) is only able to give in-
formation about the mass balance of the UDS, since is not a hybrid state equation. It does not
capture other phenomena such as the switching flow in weirs. Nonetheless, for the proposed
control strategy, that is the only information that is going to be needed, because the strategies ui
are based on volumes exclusively, as it is going to be presented in the forthcoming sections.
(a) Simple network with no full controllability assumption. (b) Simple network with the full controllability assumption.
Figure 4.1: After the model extention is performed to the system, each
sewer pipe has a retention gate at its entrance. This causes all
the inflows to sewer pipes to be controllable.
4.1.2 Model Extention
Typically, a UDS has a small amount of active elements, i.e., retention gates and redirection
gates, which derives in a quite limited controllability of the flows that run through each sewer
pipe. This may cause problems if a control strategy requires full controllability of all the states,
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and may lead to poor performances. For that matter, it is first assumed that there is a retention
gate at the entrance of each sewer pipe in the network. This means that the inflow to each sewer
pipe is completely controllable, and thus, there is going to be an agent of the game associated
with that retention gate. This may seem like an unreasonable assumption, so it will be dropped
latter on, as is only required for design purposes. Figure 4.1 illustrates how a simple network
with six sewer pipes and two catchments is represented after the assumption has taken place.
Notice that it would now be possible to control all flows running through the system.
Given this assumption, it is now known that the evolution on the game can be expressed
in terms of the evolution of the volume of water inside each sewer pipe, because it is possible
to relate one agent with each sewer pipe. Moreover, it is known that each agent is not only
associated with a fictional retention gate, but with a volume of a pipe as well. Hence, it can be
said that the dynamics of each agent of the game are given by
v˙i(t) = ui − qouti , (4.3)
where vi is the state of the i-th agent, i.e., the volume stored in the i-th pipe, ui is the action
of the i-th agent, i.e., the controlled inflow to the i-th pipe, and qouti is the total outflow of the
i-th pipe. It should be noted that there are some constraints in ui, since the maximum inflow to
a particular pipe cannot be greater than the total outflow from pipes whose outputs are directly
connected to the i-th pipe, plus the rainwater entering to the network via i-th link. As it has been
stated by [JD14], the outflow of a given sewer pipe can be expressed as a function of its inflow
in a delayed time period, and thus, the state equation (4.3) can be simplified into an equation
that only depends on the action of the agent itself.
It is interesting to point out that this model extention is a direct opossite of a model aggre-
gation such as the virtual tank model [OM10], where many states of the system are associated
to a single control variable, instead of adding a control variable for each state in the system.
This relationship is useful, because it allows to use the proposed scheme for some aggregated
representations of a UDS.
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4.1.3 Differential Game Problem Statement
Consider a set of N agents playing a DG, where the evolution of each state of the system is
given by (4.3), and each agent is trying to minimize
Ji =
∫ T
0
(vi(t)− γ( 1
N
N∑
j=1
vj(t) + η))
2 + rui(t)
2dt, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (4.4)
where γ and η are known parammeters. The main problem is to find a set of actions
{u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗i , . . . , u∗N}, i.e., inflows to sewer pipes, such that the inequalitites
Ji(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(u∗1, u∗2, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ), (4.5)
are simultaneously satisfied ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. In other words, the problem is to find a Nash
equilibrium (NE) for the proposed DG [Nas50, BO95, Eng05].
4.1.4 MFG Problem Statement
A typical UDS may have hundreds or even thousands of interconnected sewer pipes [JD14,
BD04]. This causes the DG presented in the previous section to be large scale in nature, since
there is a large amount of both states and control actions. For that matter, the solution to the
game becomes untractable, and novel tools are required in order to find the NE. Thus, a MFG
is proposed as a relief to large-scale problem in the DG. Following the basic MFG descriptions
from [LL07] and [HCM03], it is assumed that the volume of water stored in the sewer pipes,
i.e., the states of the game, behave as a random variable with probability distribution m(v, t)
at time t. This simply means that all the different volumes are condensed in a single variable.
Finally, it is assumed that agents have available the probability distribution of the volumes, i.e.,
m(v, t). It can be said that a MFG has a non-centralized information pattern, in which all agents
interact indirectly using the distribution of all the system. This information pattern is illustrated
in Figure 4.2.
For the MFG, the actions of the agents are based upon the information of the probability
distribution of the volumes instead of the information from the actual volumes. This mean that
a particular agent is more interested in the proportion of volumes that are in a particular level,
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Figure 4.2: Non-centralized model of the MFG where agents have available
the information of the distribution.
rather than the real volumes. Hence, the agents in the MFG game are trying to minimize
JMFGi =
∫ T
0
(vi(t)− γ(m¯(t) + η))2 + ru2i dt, (4.6)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
where m¯(t) =
∫
R vm(v, t)dv is the mean of the probability distribution of the volumes. Notice
that (4.1) and (4.6) are identical if N →∞ in the differential game [LL07].
Thus, the main problem is as follows: consider a MFG with N agents, where the dynamics
of a single agent are given by (4.3), and each agent is trying to minimize a cost functional such
as (4.6). Then, the the problem is to find a set of actions {u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗i , . . . , u∗N} such that the
following inequalitites
JMFGi (u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ JMFGi (u∗1, u∗2, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ) (4.7)
are simultaneously satisfied ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. In other words, the problem is to find a mean
field NE of the game [HCM03, NCMH13].
In general, the MFG problem formulation is more suitable for typical UDS because they are
large scale in nature. However, the DG problem formulation is useful when there is some kind
of model aggregation in the representation and the number of states is small.
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4.1.5 The Multi-population MFG definition
Up to now, the control problem has been focused around the minimization of overflows in the
UDS. Although that objective is arguably the most important one, the controller of an UDS
might have some other objectives, such as the transport of sewage to a WWTP. If it is desired
to consider multiple objectives in the cost functional (4.6), the solution would become harder
to compute, due to the extra complexity that the multiobjective optimization problem brings.
A more convenient idea is to solve the multiobjective MFG by means of a multipopulation
MFG (MP-MFG) [BMA14]. For this approach, each population in the game has a distinct goal,
e.g., one population might focus on the even water distribution, while other might focus on the
transport of the sewage to a WWTP. Even though it is possible to consider as many populations
(and in term, as many objectives) as needed, for this thesis only two goals are considered:
the minimization of overflows and the maximization of WWTP usage. Therefore, only two
populations are required.
In a MP-MFG, the decisions of an agent from a particular population are based upon the
shared information from its neighbor populations according to a known information graph. This
scheme is quite flexible since a given population is not interacting directly with any agent from
other populations, but rather with the populations as groups. This means that for this scheme, a
single population does not care whether or not a MFG is occuring in the neighbor populations,
because agents in the population only require specific information from the neighbors regardless
of how it was determined. Thus, it is not required to have a MFG system on each node on the
graph, which is convinient if one wants to use different control strategies combined. Figure
4.3 shows a possible configuration of 4 different MFG taking place simultaneously. In this
configuration, each game shares information with its neighbors in order to guarantee a certain
operation, as in the case of the UDS.
Consider a MFG as the one previously presented. In this approach, all agents are naturally
seeking an even volume within all the pipes of the network. This water is stored, and in order
to safetly evacuate it, it should be transported into a WWTP so that no recieving environment is
damaged. The task of transporting the water to a WWTP is performed by an MPC based on the
hyrbid linear delayed (HLD) model, whose objecive is the maximization of WWTP inflow and
minimization of combined sewer overflow (CSO) [JD14]. Given that the MP-MFG approach
does not require the interconnection of multiple MFG schemes, this MPC approach can be used
combined with the MFG to minimize the overflows, so that both control objectives are achieved.
Nonetheless, a coupuling term is required to guarantee a suitable interaction between the
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Figure 4.3: Example of a possible configuration of multiple networks
interconnected and sharing information.
two strategies. This coupuling interaction is described as follows:
• The agents in the MFG seek an agreement in the stored volume of water inside the sewer
pipes.
• Once the best possible agreement has been reached, all agents as a group follow a certain
storage element state of the MPC part, e.g., a collector volume or a tank volume.
• This will naturally decrease the volume stored in the pipes and increse the volume stored
in the MPC part.
• While the sewage is stored in the MPC portion, the MPC controller transports the water
safetly to the WWTP.
Notice that the second step in the interaction above sends water to the “MPC section” only when
it is able to process it.
These interactions can be captured by the following cost fuction:
JMP−MFGi =
∫ T
0
(vi − (w1m¯+ w2vMPC)
2
)2 + r(qiin)
2 dt, (4.8)
where vMPC ∈ R is the storage variable from the MPC portion, and w1, w2 ∈ R are tuning
parameters. Notice that this function explicitly states that the agents from the MFG are tracking
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two variables, one asociated with local interactions, and one with global interactions. Notice
that since vMPC is a given value to the MFG, cost functions (4.6) and (4.8) have the same
structure.
4.2 Problem Statement
Consider a MP-MFG with two populations, where the agents of the first population evolves
according to (4.3) and each agent is minimizing the cost functional (4.8). The second population
is an MPC-based controller where the control-oriented model (COM) evolves according to a
HLD representation as
T∑
i=0
MiX(t− i) = m(t), (4.9)
T∑
i=0
NiX(t− i) ≤ n(t), (4.10)
where the definitions of all the parameters are given in [JD14], and the controller is trying to
maximize the usage of a WWTP (which is a state represented in the vector X) over a known
prediction horizon. The problem is to find a set of inflows to the pipes of the MFG population
{u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗N} such that the inequalities
JMP−MFGi (u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ JMP−MFGi (u∗1, u∗2, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ) (4.11)
are simultaneously satisfied, while at the same time, the flow through retention and redirection
gates in the MPC-based population are maximazing the usage of a WWTP.
4.2.1 Controller Implementation
The MP-MFG problem formulation presented previously is stated as a continuous time problem.
However, the HLD-based MPC use for the management of the WWTP usage (as presented in
[JD14]) is formulated in discrete time. This means that some modifications must be performed
to either of the approaches to have a succesful coupling between them. Since the MPC approach
requires an online optimization at each sampling time, a continuous-time approach is not con-
venient. Hence, a discrete-time approach to the MFG is proposed, so that a proper coupling
can be achieved. The discretization of the approach is based on the formulation presented in
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[NCMH13], where the MFG is presented as a set of coupled differential equations, instead of
the canonical coupled non-linear partial differential equations from [LL07], i.e., the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov system. This simplification is possible due to the
linear-quadractic (LQ) nature of the game, where the state equation of the agents is linear and
the cost function is quadratic.
For the sake of simplicity, the explicit solution of the game is first enunciated. Following the
definitions from [NCMH13], it is possible to write an explicit solution to the MP-MFG using
traditional tools. These solutions require the implementation of a Riccati equation coupled with
an auxilary equation, to compensate for the mean field effect. Notice that this approach is
not different from a traditional LQ tracker [LS95]. It is convenient to rewrite the optimization
problem for each agent with some auxilary variables, i.e.,
min
qiin
∫∞
0 e
−ρt
[
(vi − g(m¯))2 + r(qiin)2
]
dt, (4.12)
subject to
v˙i(t) = q
i
in − qiout, (4.13)
where g(m¯) = (w1m¯+w2vMPC)2 , and the exponential is to accomodate for the infinite-time hori-
zon. As it has been stated in [NCMH13], the previous optimal control problem can be solved
by means of the following equations:
qiin = −
1
r
(pvi + s), (4.14)
p2 + rρp− r = 0, (4.15)
s˙(t) = (ρ+
p
r
)s(t) + g(m¯), (4.16)
˙¯m(t) = −1
r
(p m¯(t) + s), (4.17)
where (4.14) is the control law, (4.15) and (4.16) are the Riccati equation and the auxilary
equations, and (4.17) is the equation that determines the evolution of the mean field. Equation
(4.17) is determined by averaging the state equation of each agent, after applying the control
law (4.14). It is important to point out that this solution is consistent with the scheme presented
in [LL07], since (4.15) and (4.16) represent the HJB equation, and (4.17) represents the FPK
equation.
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Given that the previous system of equations is in fact a set of ordinary differential equa-
tions, it can be discretizied by means of any discretization tool. For this thesis, the system is
discretizied by means of an Euler forward approximation, using a ∆t equal to the sampling time
from the HLD-based MPC. Therefore, the implementation of the control scheme requires the
solution to the following set of equations
v+i = vi + ∆t(q
i
in − qiout) (4.18)
s+ = s+ ∆t
[
(ρ+
p
r
)s+ g(m¯)
]
(4.19)
m¯+ = m¯+ ∆t
[− 1
r
(p m¯+ s)
]
(4.20)
where now every variable is in discrete time, and v+i = vi(k + 1), ∀k ∈ Z. Now, the MFG has
been discretized, and it is possible to implement it side-by-side with the MPC approach, where
vMPC is a simple constant to the MFG.
4.2.2 Constraint Satisfaction Problem
As it has been stated before in this chapter, it is assumed that the inflow to each sewer pipe
is controllable. Obviously, this is not a realistic case, since a typical CSN may only have a
few gates but hundreds of sewer pipes. For that matter, a map between the optimal inflows
computed by the MFG and the available gates must be consider, in order for the implementation
to be possible. The map between this two sets of variables is performed by means of a constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP), which uses the optimal inflows as a given set. The CSP finds a set of
variables such that the optimal inflows provided by the MFG satisfy a set of equations provided
by a HLD model.
In the HLD proposed in [JD14], the state vector collects all the important variables from the
network such as flows through weirs, overflows on nodes, gate inflows, and inflows to sewer
pipes. Hence, the CSP must find a set of every other variable, different from the inflows, such
that the model holds. Hence, by using the HLD model, the CSP can be written as follows:
mingates 0∑T
i=0MiX(t− i) = m(t),∑T
i=0NiX(t− i) ≤ n(t),
where the only known variables in the state vector X are the inflows to the pipes. Notice that,
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by finding a vector X that satisfies all the equalities and inequalities above, the inflows running
through the gates can be easily read from that vector.
4.2.3 State Estimation Problem
In order to determine their best strategies, agents use the current value of the distribution of
others. This means that, in order to compute the optimal strategies, it is required to have full
information about the volumes of the pipes. For a real life application, having a sensor at each
sewer pipe is quite expensive, and thus, is it possible to measure at a few number of pipes only.
For that matter, a way to determine the volume of water inside each pipe, only using the available
measured information, should be considered.
For this thesis, it is proposed to use a state observer based on the one proposed on [JD14],
which estimates the current state of the network by means of a optimization problem over a mov-
ing window, i.e., a moving horizon estimator (MHE). This scheme uses the same HLD model
that is used for the CSP that determines the setting for the gates in the controller implementation.
The MHE uses information from Ho past steps, and minimizes the diference between the mea-
sured outputs and the estimated outputs. This problem is equivalent to a predictive controller,
but backwards in nature. Using the HLD, the past information from the network can be written
as follows:
T∑
i=0
MiXo(t− i+ k) = m(t+ k), (4.21)
T∑
i=0
NiXo(t− i+ k) ≤ n(t+ k), (4.22)
k = −Ho + T + 1, . . . , 0,
where Ho is the number of past measured variables that will be used in the problem. Following
the propositions from [JD14], the measurments from the system can be written as projections
from the state vector as
Y (t) = piyX(t),
U(t) = piUX(t),
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and the optimization problem associated with the MHE can be written as follows [JD14]:
minXo,y ,U 1
>
y y + 1
>
U U
subject to
Mo1 (t)Xo = Mo2 (t),
No1 (t)Xo ≤ No2 (t),
−y ≤ ΠyXo − Yˆ(t) ≤ y,
−U ≤ ΠUXo − Uˆ(t) ≤ U ,
AeqXo(t) = beq(t),
AineqXo(t) ≤ bineq(t),
where Xo is the state vector at all Ho +T + 1 time instant, Mo1 , No1 ,Mo2 and No2 are matrices to
accomodate for the estimations at all past time instants, Yˆ(t) and Uˆ(t) are the measured values
of the input and output variables, 1y and 1U are vectors of ones of dimensions Ho · number −
of−outputs andHo ·number−of− inputs respectively, and y and U are auxilary variables
used to reformulate the minimization of the 1-norms ||ΠyXo − Yˆ||1 and ||ΠUXo − Uˆ||1 as
a mixed integer linear problem (MILP). Additional equality and inequality constraint are just
regular bounds from the state vector and its hybrid nature.
The closed-loop scheme proposed for this thesis is shown in Figure 4.4. It shows all the
inputs and outputs from all the important elements from the framework.
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Figure 4.4: Block diagram from the proposed scheme. It shows all the
inputs and outputs from all the important elements from the
approach.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY AND RESULTS
The proposed controller is tested with the network shown in Figure 3.2a. This UDS is composed
of 4 sub-catchments that drain into a tree-like network that, in turn, converges into a common
outlet node. This network gives a convenient representation of how a full-size UDS would look
like, because of its strong convergence topology. Moreover, this network allows to study one of
the most common problem associated with UDSs, which is the uneven use of the pipes of the
system, which leads into poor wastewater management, and in most cases, flooding. Hence, this
network is a suitable testbed for determining the performance of controllers of UDSs. This net-
work is implemented as a virtual reality programed in DHI MOUSE, and thus all the presented
results use the real SVE as part of their core numerical implementation. Hence, the results show
how the controller would behave in a real-life implementation.
5.1 Case Study
The proposed scheme is applied into the Riera Blanca network in the city of Barcelona, Spain.
The network is shown in Figure 5.1. This is a typical UDS that drains into the Mediterranean sea
and a WWTP located downstream of the network. As many UDSs, this network is a collection
of several elements such as pipes, tanks, and weirs, that carry the sewage throughout the city.
Table 5.1 shows a summary of all the major elements found in this system. As with most UDSs,
this system has a quite strong convergence topology, in which the whole system ultimately
converges to a single big sewer pipe. This sewer pipes is a large controllable collector that spans
over 1.5km and has a quite little slope, causing it to be a suitable storage element. Following the
controllable collector downstream, there are the two outlets of the network: the WWTP and the
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Mediterranean sea. This WWTP has a maximum capacity of 2 m3/s, causing any inflow greater
than this value to become CSO automatically.
Table 5.1: Parameters of Riera Blanca network
Element Quantity
Tank 2
Pipe 145
Weir 3
Gate 10
Overflow 11
Collector 1
Rain Inflow 68
The proposed approach utilizes a partition of the system in which one portion is performing
the flooding minimization task and the other one is managing the WWTP uses. Given that the
outlets of the network are located after the collector and it is able to act as a storage element, it
is a suitable idea to divide the network at that point, having both outlets and the collector in the
same partition. The selected partitioning allows to decentralize both objectives, as it has been
proposed before in this thesis. Figure 5.2 shows the two partitions where the MFG portion is
performing the flooding minimization task, while the MPC portion is performing the WWTP
usage task. Notice that for this approach, the selected vMPC from (4.8) is the volume from the
big sewer pipe. This means that the MFG portion only sends water as long as there is available
space inside the big sewer pipe. As for the controller implementation, the system has a sampling
time ∆t = 1min, which is use for both the MP-MFG approach as well as for the MPC approach.
All the information regarding the network is provided by CLABSA (Clavegueram de
Barcelona S.A), which includes three-dimensional coordinates of sewer pipes and junctions,
crosssectional geometries and materials of sewer pipes, tank geometries and gate characteris-
tics. In order order to test the controllers, a virtual reality of the network is programmed using a
DHI’s MOUSE callibrated with real data provided by CLABSA, as proposed in [JD14]. This is
a quite accurate model that is useful for simulation purposes, since it is capable to model each
element of the system, as well as all the switching phenomena from hybrid elements such as
weirs and flooding-runoff.
This network has 10 gates that operate as active elements for the system. However, the
proposed scheme requires 1 gate for each sewer pipe in the system, thus it would require 145
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Figure 5.1: Riera Blanca network, Barcelona, Spain.
gates to propertly function. Having that amount of gates is not possible and an additional tool
is required to deal with that problem. The main outputs of the MFG portion of the approach are
all the inflows to each sewer pipe, knowing that there is a constraint on the maximum inflow.
Hence, the MFG portion returns a target value for the flows of the network, which can then be
pursued by a local controller at the gates. This task is performed by a quite simple constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP) as proposed in [JD14]. This CSP is a follow
mingates 0∑T
i=0MiX(t− i) = m(t),∑T
i=0NiX(t− i) ≤ n(t),
where all the flows in vectorX are already given. Notice that solving this CSP also regulates the
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MFG
MPC
Figure 5.2: Proposed partitioning of the Riera Blanca network for the
MP-MFG.
gates that run into the tanks of the network, which ultimately regulates their volumes. Notice
that the only desired information from the CSP are the gate flows, which are then pluged into
the programmed virtual reality of the network.
5.2 Results and Discussion
The network is tested using three different scenarios: no controller within the loop, full HLD-
based MPC, and the proposed MP-MFG approach. These scenarios allow to show the main
problems found in the network, as well as the performance and effectiveness of the proposed
scheme compared to a more traditional technique. Each scenario is tested using four differ-
ent real-rainfall events provided by CLABSA from years 2002, 2006, and 2011. Figure 5.3
shows the total inflow entering the network during the four rain events. Notice that each rainfall
event has a very distinctive charactistic, which makes them suitable as an impartial benchmarks
for simulation. Also, it is important to point out that all the cases are implemented in DHI’s
MOUSE, and thus they represent the reality as close as possible (as it solves the SVEs).
As it has been stated before, the two main potential problems from this network are the
heavy flooding and the poor WWTP usage. Thus, all the plots and results are based upon that
data, and no other information is shown unless required.
Figure 5.4 shows the total overflows coming out of the network into street level for all the
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Figure 5.3: Rain-rain scenarios provided by CLABSA used for testing the
proposed scheme in the Riera Blanca network.
different control scenarios, and for all the different rain events. When no controller is used in
the system, the system presents a serious flooding problem due to the poor management in the
active elements. It can be seen that both control strategies, i.e., the MPC and the MP-MFG,
are able to reduce the total overflow that the network originally had. It is interesting to see that
for the 09-10-2002 scenario, the MP-MFG is not able to do such a good job (compared to the
MPC). This is due to the fact that this rain event in not uniform as the others (see Figure 5.3),
which causes the mean of the volumes to change quite rapidly, which ultimately misleads the
controller. The values of the total volume of overflow are presented in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.5 shows the total inflow entering the WWTP for all the different control scenarios,
and for all the different rain events. When no controller is used in the system, the total inflow
to the WWTP completely surpasses the maximum capacity of the plant, and thus it instantly
becomes CSO. However, when any of the controller schemes are applied, the total flow running
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Table 5.2: Total overflow for each scenario
Rain Event OL [m3] MPC [m3] MP-MFG [m3]
17-09-2002 3.7094× 103 11.5870 2.7496
09-10-2002 2.5752× 104 176.5420 8.8559× 103
15-08-2006 6.9475× 103 22.3741 14.4736
30-07-2011 1.8442× 104 166.3861 748.9536
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Figure 5.4: Total overflow coming out of the network for all the proposed
scenarios, and for the different rain events. The open-loop (OL)
overflows are in blue in all graphs, MPC overflows are in red in
all graphs, and MP-MFG overflows are in yellow in all graphs.
into the plant stays within its maximum capacity and no sewage is directly sent into the mediter-
ranean sea. It is interesting to notice that for all cases, the MP-MFG takes longer to reach the
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Figure 5.5: Total inflow entering the WWTP for all the proposed scenarios,
and for the different rain events. The open-loop (OL) inflows
are in blue in all graphs, MPC inflows are in red in all graphs,
and MP-MFG inflows are in yellow in all graphs.
maximum capacity of the WWTP. This is due to retention property from the microscopic inter-
action inside the MFG portion of the scheme. Since pipes seek an agreement on their volumes,
it is less important to send water downstream.
Both approaches are able to fullfil the requirements of the system, and guaranteeing a suit-
able operation. Nonetheless, the MPC approach performes slightly better than the MP-MFG
approach. However, this improvement in performance causes the MPC approach to take longer
computation times, compared to the MP-MFG approach. From all the rain events presented, the
most complex, computationalwise is the 15-08-2006, due to the double peak found in the rain
gauge. For this rain event, the MPC approach takes an average of 2.1 time units to compute the
solution, while the MP-MFG approach takes 1 time unit, making it faster. This is particulary
useful in real-time appliacations where the computational times are an important decision factor.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, this thesis has proposed a control scheme that uses a combination between MFGs
and MPC, which allows to successfully control a CSN. The proposed scheme has the advantages
from game theoretic approaches, e.g., the ability to have distributed information patterns for
some cases and the reduced computational burdens, as well as the advantages from predictive
control approaches, e.g., the ability to consider constraints on the states and inputs, and its multi-
input multi-output capabilities. It has been shown that the proposed scheme is able to perform
within an acceptable performance margin for a virtual reality that uses the SVEs as its numerical
core. Also, a simpler scheme based on pure DGs, that can be used for system that do not have
a large number of system variables, has been enunciated. The most important aspects from the
proposed scheme, as well as the pure DG scheme are listed below.
• The proposed scheme uses a partition of the system that allows to combine multiple con-
trol strategies, such as a MFG and a MPC.
• The MFG partition uses non-centralized information patterns, in which the optimal inflow
to each sewer pipe is computed by means of an optimal control problem, that uses the
average value of the volume on water inside every other sewer pipe.
• The MPC partition uses a HLD COM that is able to represent the network in a quite high
level of detail, without considering complex non-linear equations.
• The HLD model used in the MPC partition allows to optimize over any variable inside the
network. This means that it is possible to consider objectives such as the maximization of
WWTP usage or mantaining some variables below some safety levels.
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• The combination between a MFG approch with a HLD based MPC uses less computa-
tional resources compare to a full HLD-based MPC, which in term, derives in less com-
putation times.
• The pure DG proposed approach is able to consider completely distributed information
patterns on local controllers of a CSN.
• Since only a DG is consider in the pure DG approach, it runs significally faster compared
to a linear MPC approach.
• The main proposed scheme in this thesis has been tested in DHI MOUSE, which shows
how the scheme would perform on a real-life implementation for the selected network,
i.e., the Riera Blanca network.
6.1 Contributions
The main contributions from this thesis are outlined as follows:
• Improving the computation times for a real-time implementation of controllers for CSN,
without sacrificing performance.
• Determining completely distributed schemes, based on consensus-like algorithms, for the
control of CSNs.
• Combining two distinct control strategies, which have completely different advantages,
deriveng in a versatile framework.
• Implementing the proposed scheme on a real network using a virtual reality and not only
a linear model.
6.2 Directions for Future Research
Since this thesis has three distinct topics underlying the main constributions, i.e., DGs, MFGs,
and MFGs combined with other approaches, the future directions are quite broad. Here, a few
of this directions are listed.
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• As for the real implementation of the schemes, in this thesis it was asumed that it is
possible to have measures of inflows to sewer pipes. Although this is possible, it is quite
expensive. It is a more suitable idea to consider level measures in the pipes, which are
gotten from much cheaper sensors.
• As for the MFG approach in the proposed scheme, the game is not able to explicitly
consider constraints that the system may have. All constraints were satisfied by using
saturations on the input and states variables. This causes a degradation in the performance
of the global approach. For that matter, it is recomended to consider a mechanism that
allows to consider constraints in a OCP such as a dual MPC approach.
• As for the pure DG approach, it is quite relevant to consider delayed models for the
strategies of the agents. This is due to the fact that there are delays on every sewer pipe in
the system that the agents should consider.
• Finally, it should be pointed out that the proposed scheme allows to consider any com-
bination of a control strategy with a MFG. Hence, it is possible to study the interaction
between a MFG and other strategies, such as a pure DG.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
MPC Model Predictive Control
MFG Mean Field Game
MPMFG Multi Population Mean Field Game
DG Differential Game
CSN Combined Sewer Network
UDS Urban Drainage System
OCP Optimal Control Problem
MHE Moving Horizon Estimator
HLD Hybrid Linear Deleyad
COM Control Oriented Model
WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant
CSP Constraint Satisfaction Problem
NE Nash Equilibrium
VT Virtual Tank
VFC Volume to Flow Conversion
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Problem
HJB Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
FPK Fokker Planck Kolmogorov
CSO Combined Sewer Overflows
SVE Saint Venant Equation
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